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shareholder in the future." In the instant case no title was to pass until
final payment, nor was the plaintiff to have any right to vote the shares,
nor was any stock to be issued to him. Since plaintiff was not a share-
holder, therefore, he should not be allowed to recover the money on the
theory that it represented dividends, but he should be allowed to recover
it on the implied promise of the corporation that it would allocate a sum
of money to him which would be measured by the amount of profits. The
amount with which plaintiff was credited on the books of the corporation
would be good evidence as to what a dividend would have been had one
been declared.12
G. M.
CORPORATIONS--LIAILITY or STOCKHOLDER FOR SHARES ISSUED IN VIOLA-
TION or BLUE SKY LAws-[Kansas].--The effect of participation in the
affairs of a corporation on the rights and liabilities of a purchaser of stock
sold in violation of the Blue Sky laws, though seldom considered by the
courts, is important in view of the oft-quoted statement that such stock
is void, or, in some jurisdictions, voidable at the purchaser's option.' In a
recent case a trustee in bankruptcy of a corporation sued to recover from
a stockholder the amount of an unpaid subscription. The Kansas Supreme
Court stated, though the point was not raised by the pleadings, that as the
defendant was an incorporator, director, treasurer and member of the
executive committee, he could not avail himself of the defense of the com-
pany's noncompliance with the Kansas Securities Act.2 The fact that the
company was insolvent and that the defendant was so actively engaged in
its affairs, of course, presented the case in its strongest light.
Except in the jurisdictions where sales in violation of the Blue Sky
laws are valid,3 a person who has merely contracted for the purchase of
stock, without being active in the corporate business, may rely on the de-
fense of illegality in a suit by a solvent corporation for the purchase price.4
11. Stern v. Mayer, 166 Minn. 346, 207 N. W. 737 (1926).
12. Transport Co. v. Jones, 260 U. S. 747, 43 S. Ct. 248, 67 L. ed. 493
(C. C. A. 4, 1922); Hoffer Oil Corp. v. Carpenter, 34 F. (2d) 589 (C. C. A.
10, 1929).
1. Regan v. Albin et al., Golden Eagle Milling Co. v. Same, 26 P. (2d)
475, 476 (Cal., 1933) (void); Rice v. Allison, 229 Ill. App. 1 (1922) (void-
able); 14 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Private Corporations (Rev. ed. 1932) sec.
6763. Even where the transaction is said to be void, the effect is merely to
make it voidable on the part of the purchaser, since he may recover the
consideration paid. Otten v. Riesener Chocolate Co., 82 Cal. App. 83, 254
Pac. 942 (1927).
2. Norton v. Lamb, 62 P. (2d) 1311, 1313 (Kan., 1936).
3. The view taken by these courts is that their state Blue Sky law is
penal in its nature, in no way affecting the contract made in violation of the
act. Warren People's Market Co. v. Corbett, 114 Ohio St. 126, 151 N. E. 51
(1926), criticized in Comment, 35 Yale L. J. 881 (1926); Watters & Martin
v. Homes Corp., 136 Va. 114, 116 S. E. 366 (1923).
4. Witt v. Trustees' Loan & Savings Co., 33 Ga. App. 802, 127 S. E.
810 (1925); 14 Fletcher, op. cit., sec. 6770.
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Or, if he has already paid for the stock, he may rescind and sue the cor-
poration or the agent who negotiated the transaction on the common count
for money had and received.5 Nor may creditors enforce the contract after
the company's insolvency. 6
In the few cases where courts have refused recovery against the cor-
poration by the purchaser or have denied the defense of statutory noncom-
pliance in a suit by the corporation or by creditors against the purchaser,
they have relied on the doctrines of estoppel or ratification.7 But in some
instances it would seem that the courts have perverted the aim of the
legislation from protection of an unwary public to penalizing the corpora-
tion, with all its resulting harshness.8 Thus where a subscriber on a pre-
incorporation contract attended a meeting for the purpose of acceptance or
rejection of the charter, and, after its adoption, another meeting for amend-
ing the charter, was appointed on a committee to consider the problem, and
voted in favor of the proposals in each instance, the majority of the court
held he was not estopped from repudiating the contract.9 And in Reno v.
American Ice Machine Co., where plaintiff was employed by defendant cor-
poration in the direction and management of its business, attended stock-
holders' and directors' meetings during the time, and was well acquainted
with the workings of the business for several years, the court allowed re-
covery of money deducted by the corporation from plaintiff's salary in pay-
ment of the stock, on the ground that the contract was void, and neither
subsequent action on the plaintiff's part nor the corporation's subsequent
compliance with the statute could affect its validity.0 In an even more
aggravated case, where defendants, who were promoters and later directors
5. Daniels v. Craiglow et al., 131 Kan. 500, 292 Pac. '771 (1930) (re-
covery allowed against officers of the corporation); 14 Fletcher, op. cit.,
sec. 6766; see also Landwehr v. Lingenfelder et al., 249 S. W. 723 (Mo.
App., 1923), allowing recovery against members of a syndicate having arti-
cles of association resembling the articles of agreement of a corporation.
6. Gill Prtg. Co. et al. v. Goodman, 224 Ala. 263, 139 So. 250 (1932) ; 14
Fletcher, op. cit., sec. 6772; cf. In re American Aluminum Metal Products
Co., 15 F. (2d) 234 (D. C. S. D. Cal., 1926). But subsequent compliance
with the statutory requirements will bar the defense as against creditors
of an insolvent corporation. Moore v. Moffatt et al., 204 Pac. 220 (Cal.,
1922). And in Minnesota constitutional liability of shareholders of a cor-
poration is enforceable by creditors upon insolvency, though there is no
subsequent compliance with the Blue Sky law by the corporation. Webster
v. U. S. I. Realty Co. et al., 170 Minn. 360, 212 N. W. 806 (1927).
7. Cox v. Hanson, 200 Wis. 341, 228 N. W. 510 (1930) ; Winfred Farmers
Co. v. Smith, 47 S. D. 498, 199 N. W. 477 (1924); cf. Harvey v. Electric
Refrigeration Corp. et al., 246 Mich. 235, 224 N. W. 443 (1929). Some of
the elements of technical estoppel or technical ratification are often lacking.
The courts really rely on equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais. 2 Williston,
Contracts (1927) sec. 692.
8. For discii'ssion of the policy behind the Blue Sky laws see Cook,
"Watered Stock" - Commissions - "Blue Sky Laws" - Stock Without Par
Value (1921) 19 Mich. L. Rev. 583, 590.
9. Flournoy v. Highlands Hotel Co., 170 Ga. 467, 153 S. E. 26 (1930).
10. 72 Cal. App. 409, 237 Pac. 784 (1925).
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,of a corporation, issued stock to themselves in violation of a permit requir-
ing sales to be made for cash, and negotiated the stock to an innocent pur-
chaser, the company was denied recovery for the purchase price.11
However salutary the effect of the Blue Sky laws, it is submitted that
the courts should halt in carrying them to the logical extreme, and in cases
where it is obvious that the purchaser, through participation in the com-
pany's affairs, has adequate knowledge of the objects and financial status
of the enterprise, he should not be protected. 12 It would seem that the view
taken in the instant case is wholly justified.13
S. J. B.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-LIABILITY OF HUSBAND FOR WIFE'S FUNERAL EX-
?ENSES-[Missouri].The plaintiff filed a claim in the probate court against
the estate of a deceased wife for services rendered at her burial. In denying
recovery the court held: "An undertaker is not entitled to recover a wife's
funeral expenses from the wife's estate, where the wife predeceased her hus-
'band and the husband's estate was ample to cover expenses."'
At common law a husband alone is bound to pay for the burial of his
deceased wife in a manner suitable to his station in life,2 and her estate is
not liable for such expenditures. 3 The courts have explained this obligation
by referring to the husband's duty to supply his wife with necessaries 4 and
to his right to recover damages against anyone who wrongfully interferes
-with her body.5
In most jurisdictions, the administration statute provides that funeral
expenses shall have priority over all other claims. 6 The effect of such a
-provision upon the liability of the husband for his wife's burial expenses
11. Coast Amusements Inc. v. Stineman et al., 115 Cal. App. 746, 2 P.
(2d) 447 (1931). But the Supreme Court of South Dakota took a more
liberal view in holding that participation in stockholders' meetings and
receipt of dividends for several years estopped the purchaser in a suit by
the corporation on a note given in payment for the stock. Winfred Farm-
ers Co. v. Smith, 47 S. D. 498, 199 N. W. 477 (1924).
12. Mere connection with the corporation in a minor capacity, of course,
should work no estoppel. Otten v. Riesener Chocolate Co., 82 Cal. App. 83,
254 Pac. 942 (1927) (night watchman); Mac Donald v. Reich & Lievre,
100 Cal. App. 736, 281 Pac. 106 (1929) (saleswoman).
13. Norton v. Lamb, 62 P. (2d) 1311 (Kan., 1936).
1. Kent v. Knight, 98 S. W. (2d) 318 (Mo., 1936).
2. Smyley v. Reese, 53 Ala. 89, 25 Am. Rep. 598 (1875) ; Sears v. Gidday,
41 Mich. 590, 2 N. W. 917, 32 Am. Rep. 168 (1879).
3. Watkins v. Brown, 85 N. Y. Supp. 820 (1903); Long v. Beard, 20 Ky.
Law Rep. 1036, 48 S. W. 158 (1900).
4. Scott v. Carothers, 17 Ind. App. 673, 47 N. E. 389 (1897).
5. Kent v. Knight, supra, note 1, 1. c. 318.
6. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 182, which deals with allowances and classifica-
tion of demands against a decedent's estate; Ill. Smith-Hurd, Rev. Stats.
of 1935, chap. 3, see. 71; Crawford & Moses, Digest of the Stats. of Ark.
(1921) sec. 97; Carroll's Ky. Stats. (1930) sec. 3868; Williams, Shannon,
'Harsh, Code of Tenn. (1932) sec. 8286.
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